San Francisco, January, 1935
By Gareth Jones
Scares of war between Japan and the United States find
fertile soil in California, where racial prejudice is powerful, but the
menace of naval conflict between the two powers appears to be almost
entirely an artificial growth encouraged by certain American interests.
For a state where unemployment is high it pays to paint a lurid picture
of the need for defence in the Pacific, for as a result the fleet is
concentrated in Californian waters, the traders benefit by the pay-roll
of the officers and the men and the ship-building yards and the aircraft
factories are provided with profitable orders.
Any event, which shows the necessity of strengthening the
naval and aviation weapons along the Pacific, is therefore exaggerated
or adapted for purposes of propaganda. Amelia Earhart’s flight from
Honolulu to San Francisco in 16 hours is used as a bogey to demonstrate
how small the ocean is becoming and how swarms of aeroplanes could
suddenly swoop down on the cities on the coast. When in April a regular
air service opened between Canton, China and Manila, Guam, Wake Island
Midway Island, Honolulu and the American mainland, the speed of the
crossing will be another argument of the jingoists to further plans of
naval and air construction.
In reality there is no direct cause of war between
America and Japan and reasonable observers on the Pacific coast realise
that two nations whose trade is so complementary would avoid war at all
costs. Japan needs American steel, cotton and oil; America wants silk
from Japan and since the war practically 40% of Japan’s foreign trade
has been with the United Stated. While there is competition in foreign
markets, Japan has little chance of damaging American one of her vital
exports, namely automobiles, nor her export of foodstuffs such as wheat.
America’s investments in the Far East provide as little
cause for direct conflict as do her trade interests. Realists in San
Francisco and Los Angeles know that her investments in her China are
meagre, that out of a total of about £15,000,000,000 of United States
funds invested abroad only $196,000,000(excluding philanthropic
investments) are invested in China (1930 figure), that naval expenses,
the cost of consuls, diplomats and marines, of chamber of commerce and
of shipping subsidies probably far exceed the total profit annually made
in business and finance, and that to risk war for a minute proportion of
America’s trade investments and trade in Japan are far more valuable
than her connections in China. “You do not fight with your best
customer”, remarked a Los Angeles editor when discussing this problem.
Another reason why realists consider there will be peace
in the Pacific between Japan and America is the tactical difficulty of
waging war across a distance of over 5,000 miles. That the Japanese
fleet would come to California, many thousand of miles from its nearest
bases and plunge into the very jaws of American defence is a fantastic
idea. To think of sending an American fleet to fight its way into the
Sea of Japan or to blockade an enemy, which, having a continental area
in Korea and Manchukuo, cannot be blockaded, is equally futile.
Even if war were a tactically feasible, political reasons
for armed conflict are now absent. American isolationism still feeds on
the evil results of interfering in the last war and there is at present,
a definite move away from Imperialism, which is characterised by voting
of independence to the Philippines, by the withdrawal of the last
American marine from Haiti after 19 years of occupation and by Secretary
of State Hull’s declaration on the Latin America that no government need
fear intervention on the part of the United States under the Roosevelt
administration. The period of aggrandisement in the Pacific is over and
there is much advocacy of withdrawal from possession of territory. A
report of the Harris Foundation of the University of Chicago finds, for
example, that possession of the Philippines, Samoa and Guam weakens the
United States and that those islands are hostage to potential enemies.
Japan’s absence of allies is also noted by publicists in
California as a barrier against war and this factor is characterised by
the remark of a Japanese travelling in America: “We are afraid, for we
are isolated. It would be difficult to have China on our side and the
United States and Britain seem to be coming to an agreement. In a war
all would be against us.”
An equally important Japanese factor in calming moderate
opinion is the budgetary difficulties, which Japan is suffering. The
protests made by the Minister of Finance, Takahashi, against the
military expenditures in Manchukuo are interpreted as indicating that
the opponents of Japanese militarism are daring to raise their head and
in support of this the speech of Takao Saito, leader of the Minseito
Party, is quoted, in which he said: “The life of the people is insecure
due to the menace of war and to the menace to freedom. Because the
Government permits the army and the navy to absorb too great a portion
of our national funds we are forced to sacrifice measures which would
promote the welfare of farmers and rural communities.”
While direct causes of war between Japan and the United
States are absent, there is, however, one indirect cause, which
has before brought America into war, namely insistence of neutral
rights. If there is a war between Japan and Russia, American vessels
will be engaged in carrying goods to Russia or to China with the final
destination of Russia, and among the wares, traders are certain to
dispatch contraband goods. The day might thus come when a Japanese
cruiser would stop an American vessel. Unscrupulous newspapers would
then arouse American public opinion and portray the same of the American
citizens being ill-treated by members of what they consider an inferior
race, and the problem of the freedom of the seas, which brought the
United States into the war of 1812 against England and the Great War,
might involve her in armed conflict with Japan.
Unless President Roosevelt modifies the traditional
American policy of protecting her traders against blockade, there is a
slight danger of a Japanese-American War, Japan and the Soviet Union are
ever engaged in fighting. For this reason the indication that the
President aims at amending neutrality rights in order to keep the United
States out of embroilment is regarded as a bright omen for peace on he
Pacific. If there is war in that area, it will be safer for the United
States that each trader sends goods to the belligerent nation at his own
risk. Revision of neutrality rights along these lines, leading to the
abandonment of the Freedom of the Seas, which has been a stumbling block
in Anglo-American relations would lead to better feeling between the
United States and Britain and by increasing against Japanese aggression.
Although a war between Japan and the United States –
except a war arising out of the violation of neutral rights appears -
almost impossible, there remains a number of problems, which can lead to
strained relations between the two countries. Racial hatred mounts in
the West from time to time and recently this has been typified by the
fight over land ownership between the whites and the Japanese in
Arizona. Last year a number of Japanese migrated from the Imperial
Valley in Southern California to the irrigated district of central
Arizona where with their industry, thrift and low standard of living
they provided severe competition with local farmers. The result has
been several bombings of Japanese farm property and arson of Japanese
dwellings.
Such events intensify the bitterness of feeling over
immigration problems. Although an intelligent section of the
Californian population advocates that Japanese be allowed to enter on a
quota, instead of being entirely excluded as at present, a more
vociferous section fights vigorously any attempt to modify the Exclusion
Act. It is not likely that the wound dealt to the Japanese
susceptibility by not allowing any Japanese immigrants will be healed
and the supersensitive ness of the Japanese on this point will continue
to mar friendship between Nippon and the United Stated.
Other grievances – although not deep enough to cause war
– are likely to separate Japan and America, among which are Japan’s
blows at America’s traditional policies in the Far East, namely the Open
Door and the Integrity of China. The settling up of the oil monopoly in
Manchukuo, which may be followed by the establishment of a Manchukuo
tobacco monopoly, shows that the Open Door, to quote the Christian
Science Monitor, “is being taken off its hinges and the opening steadily
boarded up, nailed and sealed.” Statements that American trade with
Manchukuo has increased since Japanese occupation are misleading
because, while it is true that American experts to Manchuria are greater
in 1933 than in 1932, America’s share has since 1929 been reduced from
9% of the total import trade of Manchuria to 5% in 1933, while the
Japanese share of imports has risen to 66% in 1933 as compared with 44%
in 1929.
American fear of trade competition, especially in Latin
America, may lead also to worsening of relations. Californian traders
are alarmed by the Japanese imitation of American goods, and their low
prices are as staple an item of conversation in San Francisco and in Los
Angles clubs as they are in the Orient.
Politically, the Californians fear the extension of
Japan’s policy of “Asia for the Asiatics”, although few would be found
willing to lay down the bones of an American soldier to stop Japan. “If
the Japanese see that the Americans threat s are never backed by force,
they will venture more and more” is a prophesy often made on the Pacific
coast and the belief that Japan will seize the Philippines as soon as
those islands are abandoned by America is almost universally held.
Curiously however, Japans denunciation of the Washington
Treaty has failed to arouse great excitement in California and is met by
confident declaration that the United States could outbuild Japan and
that, moreover the building of a large American Navy would be good for
California. However illogical it may appear the Western American
combines a growing Big Navy consciousness with a desire for withdrawal
from commitments in the Far East.
The grievances and fears of the Japanese are as deep as
the American. They still resent bitterly the Exclusion Act, the
continuation of the Stimson policy of non-recognition of Manchukuo and
the concentration of the American fleet in the Pacific. Nor have they
forgotten that at the end of the 1905 Russo-Japanese War, President
Theodore Roosevelt conducted a conference at which Japan did not gain
all she desired and that at the Conference of Versailles, President
Wilson helped to make Japan yield Shantung.
These differences between Japan and
America are creating a strong pro-British sentiment on the Pacific coast
and there is general support for an entente between Washington and
London. The passage of General Smuts’ speech in November advocating
Anglo-American understanding, when quoted by a British lecturer, was
enthusiastically cheered in several towns. The need for closer
relations between the two countries is stressed in conversations and
articles with greater emphasis than formerly. That this sentiment will
lead to any alliance is highly improbable, for hatred of “entangling
alliances “ is still powerful and there is a suspicion that Britain is
using the United States “ to pull her chestnuts out of the fire for her
in China”. Nevertheless, in the event of no agreement being reached
between the three powers in the Pacific, there will be almost universal
approval of Anglo-American unity in defense of common interests in the
Far East.
The End
********
Friday, March 15th,
1935
Menace Of War
Between America and Japan Non-Existent
---
By Gareth Jones
Will there one day be war between America and
Japan?
This was the vital topic of conversation I
found in the clubs and embassies of Washington. I feel that the menace
is almost non-existent, that it has been a scare engineered unscrupulous
newspapers and by certain Californian interests who want to have the
fleet concentrated in the Pacific in order that California may benefit
from the naval pay- roll and orders.
When I expressed these views to a leading
diplomat (not British) he disagreed with me. “You minimise the danger
of war,” he said. “A fight must come. Japan must extend towards the
Philippines, Sumatra, and Java, and America must stop her.”
I replied: “But I do not think America would
sacrifice lives and money to stop Japan expanding.”
“You have forgotten the trade conflict,” he
retorted. “ Japanese competition is extending everywhere, and they
offer great competition in South America. America must stop Japan.
“Look at the other causes of conflict.
America refuses to recognise Manchukuo. America hurts Japanese
sensitiveness to the core by refusing to admit a single Japanese
immigrant.
“But the greatest danger is on neutral
rights. If there is war between Japan and Russia, Americans are certain
to send contraband goods to Russia or goods to China destined for
Russia; cotton for instance will be despatched, and cotton is used in
munitions. One fine day a. Japanese cruiser is going to stop an
American boat, and Americans will say, “What do they mean by interfering
with our trade?’ And over-night there might be a war situation.”
At the Embassy
With these disturbing expressions ringing in
my ears I decided to call and see the man most responsible for relations
between Japan and America, namely, Mr. Saito the Japanese Ambassador.
Mr. Saito, a small courteous man with
delicately termed features, more aquiline than the usual Japanese,
laughed away prophecies of war between Japan and America. There are no
causes of conflict between the United States and Japan,” he declared.
He then outlined tome his idea of a basis of
an agreement between America and Japan, which would consolidate peace in
the Pacific. For the United States to recognise Manchukuo, he stated,
would be the first step towards such an agreement.
Secondly, if the United States abolished the
Exclusion Act of 1924 relations would be improved. By this Act all
immigration of Japanese into the United States was forbidden. The
Ambassador declared to me that even if only 100 Japanese were allowed to
enter the step would be appreciated, because it was a matter of
principle rather than numbers. The Ambassador resented the Japanese
being treated as an inferior race not worthy of entering the United
States.
Naval Equality
Thirdly, there might be an agreement between
the United States and Japan if America recognised the principle of naval
equality for Japan and agreed to abandon the 5 – 5 - 3 ratio for naval
vessels.
I asked the Ambassador about the economic
conflict. He stated that there should be no economic conflict, because
Japan needed American cotton and steel, while America wanted Japanese
silk. He denied that there was much competition in world markets. “We
sell pencils, cheap cotton goods and such wares. We do not compete in
American exports of automobiles,” he said.
“What about the open door? Are you not
blocking the principle of equal opportunities of trade in China?” I
asked, and raised the question of the oil monopoly in Manchukuo.
The Ambassador answered that the oil monopoly
was a question for the Manchukuo Government, for which the Japanese were
not responsible. He claimed that the oil monopoly did not crush foreign
sellers. If they had claims they could make them to the Manchukuo
Government
Peace With China
The most remarkable part of my interview
with the Japanese Ambassador was his prophecy of peace between China and
Japan. He claimed that in China public opinion was growing in favour of
an agreement with Japan. Chiang Kai-shek, he said, wanted this
agreement.
“Why should the Chinese be willing to bury
the hatchet after the events in Manchukuo?” I asked.
The Ambassador replied that the Chinese had
been disillusioned on two points. The first was in the League of
Nations, which had not stood up for China. Moreover, China was no
longer on the Council of the League. The second was in regard to
Russia, especially after the Soviet Union had sold the Chinese Eastern
Railway. This was a blow to Chinese prestige, for they felt that they
had been abandoned by the Russians, whom, they thought, would remain as
a barrier to Japanese influence in the Far East.
Will China and Japan come to an agreement?
This will be one of the outstanding problems for me to study on the
spot. Such an agreement would have a great effect on Japanese-American
relations, and would make a war Japan and America almost impossible.
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