Soviet needs peace in critical
winter
By WALTER DURANTY.Bv Wireless
to THE NEW YORK TIMES.
New York
Tunes (1857-Current file);
Nov
22, 1932: ProQuest Historical Newspapers The New York Times (1851
– 2) pg. 6.
SOVIET NEEDS PEACE IN CRITICAL
WINTER
Bolsheviks Fear War or Revolt
in Europe Would Wreck
Russia’s Program.
BUT OUTBURST IS EXPECTED
The Kremlin Believes Frantic
Foreign Nationalism Will Lead to a conflict.
By WALTER DURANTY.
By Wireless to
The New York Times
MOSCOW,
Nov. 21.—The Soviet Union confronts the Winter, which it fears will
bring disaster to Europe, with little less anxiety than some of the
capitalist countries that are trying desperately to cope with the
effects of the economic crisis.
The fact
that the U.S.S.R. has become a world State whose fortunes are interwoven
with the rest of the world is only part of the picture, as the Kremlin
sees it. The Kremlin leaders today know better than any one what misery
the depression is inflicting upon the European masses.
This is
especially true of Germany, whose agony the Kremlin sees unblurred by
the patriotic discretion of the German press or the careless optimism of
foreign correspondents anxious to make cheerful reading for the folks at
home.
Sees War or Revolt.
In the
Kremlin’s opinion the coming Winter is loaded with the deadly Issue of
war and revolution, and the Bolsheviki lean to the view that
fascism—frantic nationalism— will provoke war in an attempt to avert an
Internal explosion of the masses, preferring a quick death to slow
starvation. In either case the U.S.S.R. could hardly avoid entanglement.
Once a storm bursts, who can set its limits?
According
to the Soviet interpretation of historical events by economic cases, the
Japanese Manchurian adventure was primarily due to the effects of the
crisis upon the Japanese organic system. As a result of the Manchurian
war cloud, the Soviet Union was forced to put an extra strain upon its
transportation system and food supply, which immensely increased the
difficulties contingent upon its ambitious program of industrialization
and socialisation, known as the Five-Year Plan.
As matters
now stand the U. S.S.R. finds itself extended to the limit of its
national effort, and any additional tension could not fail to
disorganize the program on which the government has staked so much at a
cost of such sacrifice. This, therefore, is the critical period of the
program, when its undoubted gains still seem in danger of being swamped
by countless difficulties.
Holds Peace Is Vital.
If peace
can be maintained the Soviet Government is confident the difficulties
will be overcome and that a year or two will bring comparatively smooth
sailing, but a disturbance now would be little short of disastrous. More
than any country in the world the Soviet Union today finds peace
desirable and almost necessary.
For this
reason a grave revolutionary outbreak In Germany or elsewhere looms
before the Soviet Government as a positive menace, because things being
what they are the Soviet Union would be almost inevitably involved. Even
if Russia managed to hold aloof, a grave disturbance in Europe,
especially a revolutionary disturbance, would work havoc with the
Five-Year Plan, which is the keynote and kernel of Soviet policy.
That this
is the case will be shown in subsequent dispatches, but for the present
let the fact remain that Moscow Is now watching Europe with a keen
premonition of a disaster it feels almost powerless to avert. Far from
trying to foment revolution, the U.S.S. R. today is ready and eager to
cooperate in any sincere attempt to combat the effects of the depression
and to restore the economic order.
*********
Russia Reported
A series of
articles in the New York Times
Gollancz 1934.
by Walter
Duranty
THE CRISIS IN THE SOCIALISATION
OF AGRICULTURE
Page 313
Moscow,
November 24, 1932.—The Soviet programme of socialisation and
industrialisation, known as the Five-Year Plan, has run against an
unexpected obstacle— the great and growing food shortage in town and
country alike. It is as if a huge machine, constructed with incredible
effort, had begun to function, not perhaps with full efficiency, but far
better than any save the most optimistic of its builders expected, only
to confront the danger that the fuel supply that drove it suddenly had
begun to fail.
Two-thirds
of the Soviet population will be lucky if it gets more than bread,
potatoes, and cabbage this winter as a regular diet, with fish three
times a week, say, and meat perhaps once a week. And that in quantities
below the people’s wants and probably below their needs. There is no
famine or actual starvation, nor is there likely to be. And, for the
most part, all will share alike in the various localities. But it is a
gloomy picture, and as far as the writer can see, there is small sign or
hope of improvement in the near future.
The end of
the year brings to a conclusion the first Five-Year Plan and should mark
the inception of a yet more grandiose project known as the second
Five-Year Plan. In point of fact, both" plans "are a single continuous
programme which, however successful, will be prolonged indefinitely, but
which are subdivided into five-year periods for convenience and to
provide a slogan for public understanding and stimulus.
On the
face of things to-day, the first plan has done well.
*********
35 persons
arrested for complicity and sabotage.
Moscow, March 12, 1933.—Over the signature of the
Ogpu chief, M. Menzhinsky, an announcement was published to-day that 35
persons recently arrested for complicity and sabotage in a
counter-revolutionary plot in connection with agrarian difficulties,
many of them officials of the Agriculture and State Farm Commissariats
and most of them former bourgeois or landlords, were sentenced to death
yesterday, 22 others to ten years’ imprisonment, and i8 to eight years’.
The announcement adds laconically, "The sentences were
carried into execution."
This is the most comprehensive act of its kind since 48
officials of the food distribution departments were summarily executed
early in the autumn of 1930.
Among those shot the best known are M. E. Kovarsky,
formerly of the tractor department; M. M. Wolff a member of the
agricultural commissariat, who in i 931 prepared a "second Five-Year
Plan" for agriculture; and a third high official, Feodor M. Konar,
otherwise known as Polashchuk, a former vice-commissar of agriculture.
Another was an agronomist who was a member of a former millionaire sugar
family.
*********
The New York Times,
Friday March 31st 1933.
RUSSIANS HUNGRY, BUT NOT STARVING
Deaths From Diseases Due to
Malnutrition High, Yet the Soviet is Entrenched
This article by Walter Duranty was not
included in his book Russsia Reported
These were included with one dated March 31st Berlin
********
BERLIN, March 31, 1933.—The recent executions of
35 high officials in various Soviet agricultural commissariats by the
Ogpu involves a story of espionage that rivals the exploits of the
famous Eugene Azev, who for many years lived a double life as a trusted
leader of a desperate group of revolutionaries and as a spy for the
Tsarist police.
The" hero "of the latest romance was Feodor M. Konar,
lately vice-commissar for agriculture of the Soviet Union, who as such
had access to the meetings and minutes of the Council of Commissars when
his chief was absent on leave or business.
In 1920 Konar was expelled from the party on the ground
that he was responsible for the failure of the Soviet government
established in Polish Galicia during the Soviet-Polish War, but somehow
he managed to explain matters and was reinstated. There was some
confusion, he said, between him and another man named Polashchuk.
In the following year he went to Moscow to live with his
brother. The latter also was a member of the Communist party and
specialised in the affairs of the Communist International. Both were
supple citizens who displayed particular ability in stepping exactly
upon the centre of the " party line." That was an achievement in itself
during the troublous years of the intra-party opposition.
Konar specialised in agriculture and steadily advanced in
rank and importance, and two years ago he was appointed vice-commissar
in charge of state grain collections. Meanwhile, his brother made
frequent trips abroad on Communist International business, mainly to
neighbouring states.
The apartment of the two men became the centre of the
"true blue incorruptibles" of the Kremlin policy, and though most of
their friends were men of secondary standing they were on excellent
terms with the men of higher rank.
Suddenly, about a month ago, by sheer accident, according
to the general belief it was discovered that Konar also was on
"excellent terms" with a prominent foreign diplomat—too excellent
terms—and an order went out for his arrest.
The story goes that he was indignant when the Ogpu guards
summoned him. "It is absurd," he said of the order for his arrest. "I’ll
telephone" (to the Ogpu headquarters) "at once." Then they showed him
the signature on the warrant, and he buried his head in his hands.
Inquiry and Konar’s own confession brought out that for
thirteen years he was a secret agent of a foreign power and that he was,
in fact, responsible for the betrayal of the Galician Soviet because he
was also Polashchuk.
He revealed, too, that his "brother" was not related to
him by blood but was a brother agent in the same service, whose trips
abroad served admirably to supplement the information Konar was unable
to transmit directly to his diplomatic friends in Moscow.
Further investigation showed that there was a double
conspiracy—not merely for the transmission of Soviet secrets to a
foreign power, but to strike at the most vital point of the Soviet
socialisation programme in diminishing the food supply and driving the
peasants to ruin and hostility by deliberate mismanagement and sabotage
of the grain collections.
The case was considered so grave that the whole presiding
council of the Ogpu participated in the judgment. The evidence was
utterly damning and for the first time in the Ogpu’s history the verdict
was delivered without the court’s retiring for consultation.
And still another exception was made. The sentence was
carried out immediately, instead of giving forty-eight hours’ grace for
a possible pardon by the president of the republic.
********
THE HARVEST
Page 354
KHARK0V, September 17, 18, 19, 1933.—I
have just completed a 200-mile auto trip through the heart of the
Ukraine and can say positively that the harvest is splendid and all talk
of famine now is ridiculous.
Everywhere one goes and from everyone with whom one
talks—from communists and officials to local peasants—it is the same
story: "Now we will be all right, now we are assured for the winter, now
we have more grain than can easily be harvested."
This "now" is significant. It contrasts with "then "—last
winter—which, they tell you, "was hard." Hard it
was and I saw empty houses that bore witness—people ran away to find
work and food elsewhere.
On the other hand, there were no big fields of weeds such
as I saw in the North Caucasus; here they sowed a greater area than last
year and many—perhaps one might say most—of those who fled have returned
to work on the harvest. The populace, from the
babies to the old folks, looks healthy and well nourished. They
are all awaiting the day when the state grain deliveries will be
completed and they can sell on the open market the supplies of grain
that they will have received for their work days.
Each individual will get about five to seven kilograms of
grain per work day, nearly two tons on the average for the year, which
is far beyond anything they had before, except in the rich kulak
families. They expect the deliveries to be completed by the middle of
October; then they can sell the grain and buy goods.
That is the first need of the peasants, to buy goods, but
local communists and officials emphasise other needs— radio and
telephone communication and, above all, better roads and signposts.
Twenty miles from Kharkov the signposts end and the road
becomes a dirt track across the country. The peasants you ask know the
nearest village and that is all, and you travel by map and by the sun
and by guesswork.
One thing, however, is sure—the
peasants have accepted collectivisation and are willingly obeying
the Kremlin’s orders. The younger peasants already understand that the
Kremlin’s way will benefit them in the long run, that machines and mass
cultivation are superior to the old "strip system" and individual
farming.
They get help from the tractor stations and have begun to
understand that it is really help and not just orders from above but
something that will improve their own living conditions.
Some of the older ones do not yet realise this and do not
like the new way, but they are following it perforce. The
children—Pioneers, they call them—are enthusiastic. One small boy told
me, "I got a prize of a bicycle because my troop of Pioneers guarded the
grain five nights from robbers. My mother said I was silly to go out
like that and sleep in the fields, but she doesn’t understand that it is
our duty to guard socialised property."
That is good Soviet doctrine that these children have
learned.
"And how was it in the winter?" I asked the child. "Did
many people leave your village?"
"Not many, but the lazy ones and those with kulak ideas,"
he replied. "They said collective farming would never work, that we were
crazy to stay and try it. But we stayed and it does work. This year we
have better crops than ever my grandfather, who is 8o years old,
remembers."
And that is the answer—the Kremlin has got the younger
generation on its side, and the combination of good weather, improved
organisation, and new machines has produced results.
Nevertheless, one thing is clear—there has been a big
change of personnel, not only among the upper ranks of the peasantry and
the managers of the collective farms but in the Communist party
officials. Both here and in the North Caucasus one finds lots of
officials who have been on the job only six months or less.
One asks why. They reply rather vaguely, "The management
here was not efficient," or "We were sent here," or "There were kulak
elements and kulak sentiment in the managers of this or that section and
they were removed and we came to replace them."
Then they add proudly:
"But we have done the job—this year we are months ahead
of last year in grain deliveries."
I sum up my impressions from this trip and from
conversations with scores of peasants and local officials—the
collectivisation policy was not generally popular, there was much
passive resistance last year, and those who resisted suffered bitterly.
So to-day there is no more resistance and those who co-operate with the
Kremlin policy have already begun to understand, and get, its benefits.
In short, the mechanisation and collectivisation of
Russian agriculture have come to stay and the
Kremlin has won its battle.
Page 356
September 18.—" Ukraine grain
deliveries to the state had been accomplished 66 per cent by September
10—which was the same as the figure reached three months later
last year—and we expect the full quota of 5,000,000 tone to be completed
by mid-October," said the chief of the Ukrainian communist section of
the tractor stations, Alexander Asatkin.
M. Asatkin, with whom I talked Saturday, declared the
crop had surpassed the highest expectations as it had reached one ton
per acre in some sections, where the collectivists were receiving 15 to
25 kilograms (33 to 55 pounds) per working day. ,
but it is expected to run as high as seven kilograms per working day,
which is two and a half times greater than last year.
The "socialised sector" of Ukrainian agriculture this
year is 8o per cent of all the cultivated land and it is served by 646
tractor stations with an average of 40 machines each. About 70 per cent
of the peasant population is collectivised, but in some sections,
especially the southern wheat region, collectivisation has reached 85
and 90 per cent.
M. Asatkin said most positively that the Ukraine’s
33,000,000 population was amply assured of food for the coining year.
Open-market prices are expected to drop 50 to 70 per cent when the state
deliveries are concluded and the peasants are allowed to sell.
In reply to my question as to whether there had been mass
emigration last year, M. Asatkin said, "There undoubtedly was a
considerable outward flow from the villages and towns to the Donetz
basin, to White Russia and elsewhere, but we, nevertheless, accomplished
the sowing programme almost 100 per cent and with the summer months the
population tide flowed back."
To another
question as to whether the death rate was as high as 10 per cent, M.
Asatkin said firmly, "No, nothing like it. There was certainly distress
in some sections, but the reports were greatly exaggerated."
He admitted that there had been considerable mortality
among livestock, which had increased the difficulty of the
transportation problem, and he continued, "Despite the greatly augmented
production of tractors and automobiles, transportation is one of our
chief handicaps. The grain deliveries would have been completed already
with better transportation. Delivery points and elevators are literally
choked with grain."
That I can affirm from personal observation. M. Asatkin
asserted confidently that the Ukraine accepted collectivisation once and
for all and that the political section of the tractor stations had been
a decisive factor in the struggle.
He, like his colleague with whom I talked at Rostov-on-Don,
stressed the fact that the communist agents (politkas) of the
tractor stations were less coercive than organisational in their
functions.
"The peasants," he said, "now understand that we are
really trying to help them improve their methods and lives. Our chief
problem, after finishing the autumn sowing, will come during the winter
months, in what we call ‘cultural work.’
"That includes everything from propaganda and educational
meetings to improvement of radio and telephone transmission, the issuing
of newspapers—-each political unit and tractor station has its own
newspaper, published about ten times monthly—the bettering of roads, new
building, and work among the women and youngsters, whom we consider no
less important than the men."
M. Asatkin spoke with genuine enthusiasm, saying that his
eight months’ work in the Ukraine had been extraordinarily interesting
and had convinced him of the enormous possibilities of the tractor
service in developing agriculture and raising the peasants’ living
standards.
"Stalin was right," he concluded." We communists were to
blame for not organising rural life and work and for thinking the
collectives could run themselves on an efficient socialist basis without
our control."
"Why didn’t you have political sections sooner?" I asked.
"Because there were not enough tractors, for one thing," he replied.
"But now we are producing them at a rate that will utterly transform the
countryside in two or three years. Economically and culturally it will
be the greatest revolution in the history of the world, and I am proud
to have had the privilege of playing a responsible part in it."
Page 358
September 19.—Summing up the
impressions of my ten days’ trip through the North Caucasus and the
Ukraine, where I travelled with greater freedom and absence of
supervision than had been expected, I repeat the opinion that the
decisive engagement in the struggle for rural socialisation has been won
by the Kremlin.
The cost in some places has been heavy, but a generally
excellent crop is already mitigating conditions to a marked extent. But
it still is clear that Soviet administrators must overcome more
obstacles before the collective system and mechanisation of agriculture
are completely mastered.
"Any Communist party member, local official, or political
section commander who thinks the job is done because we had a good
harvest and are well ahead with grain deliveries and autumn sowing is a
social danger to-day; you might almost call him a traitor," said one of
the editors of the Rostov newspaper Molot, and M. Asatkin echoed
him.
"One of the things we now must fight the hardest is the
spirit of satisfaction and resting on laurels," said the latter. "There
is a vast amount of hard work ahead of us to create a collective edifice
on proper cultural and technical lines."
Collectivisation may now be said to have been established
on a solid foundation, with enormous benefit to the Russian countryside,
on the condition that neither this year nor for several years to come
will there be talk of extra requisitions or "voluntary super-deliveries"
above the fixed programme. Authorities everywhere say there will not be
extra demands and admit there were errors which are now corrected.
Because of what super-deliveries meant, successful
collectives paid for the mistakes and mismanagement of others. By Soviet
law and Communist party decree it is a criminal offence to-day to ask
for extra deliveries. In the event of war or a similar great emergency
it might be different, but short of such an emergency the extra delivery
system is abolished.
Page 359
Moscow, December 16, I933.—For the first time in
its history the Soviet Union has completed its state grain" collections
"before the end of the year—specifically, by December 14, which is two
and a half months earlier than ever before. Actually 96 per cent of the
collections had been made November 1, and the Crimea performed the
unprecedented feat of completing its deliveries by September 1. During
August and September, deliveries, reckoned in ten-day periods, ran from
three to five times higher than in the same period of last year.
The total of the collections is not stated in to-day’s
news, but the writer was informed last September in Kharkov by the chief
of the Ukrainian political section of the machine-tractor stations that
it would be about 24,500,000 metric tons. As the needs of the urban
population, construction camps, and army are abundantly met by
17,500,000 tons, there will be available 7,000,000 tons for reserve or
export.
In the latter respect it is noteworthy that the
proportion of wheat in this year’s collections is half as large again as
that of last year.
This
result fully justifies the optimism expressed to me by local authorities
during my September trip through the Ukraine and North Caucasus—optimism
that contrasted so strikingly with the famine stories then current in
Berlin, Riga, Vienna, and other places, where elements hostile to the
Soviet Union were making an eleventh-hour attempt to avert American
recognition by picturing the Soviet Union as a land of ruin and despair.
Second, it is a triumph for Joseph Stalin’s bold solution
a year ago of the collective farm management problem—a step that future
historians cannot fail to regard as one of the major
namely, the establishment of political sections in
the tractor stations, political moves in the Soviet Union’s
second decade. I understand that autumn sowing has slightly surpassed
the programme, and the plentiful snow of this early winter augurs well
for the future.
This year’s special preparation of tested seed for spring
sowing, although slightly behind the programme, will undoubtedly be
completed by the middle of February, and it can be stated confidently
that the "socialised sector" of agriculture—the state and collective
farms—which this year furnished 90 per cent of the grain deliveries to
the state, will approach the spring sowing with a new spirit of courage
and energy under the guidance of the political sections of the tractor
stations.
It is significant that the peasant population that fled
from grain-producing areas, which suffered last winter from a labour
shortage, has flowed back to the villages. The peasant beggars who were
a deplorable feature of life twelve months ago in Moscow, Kharkov, and
Rostov-onDon, to name only three great cities, have now wholly
disappeared.
It is difficult accurately to estimate what percentage of
the total crop the grain collections form, as conditions vary in
different regions. It probably is between 20 and 25 per cent, which
would put the cereal crop at the record figure of 100,000,000 metric
tons.
A further factor of great importance is that" free trade"
in foodstuffs henceforth will be permitted for the entire country, which
must not be considered a new "New Economic Policy" but is undoubtedly a
big advance towards the goal, announced by M. Stalin, of" making every
collective Bolshevik and every collectivist prosperous."
At the same time there is a serious obstacle to the
development of this "free trade" by collectivised and individual farmers
in the provinces which have completed their deliveries—namely, a
shortage and poor distribution of manufactured goods and other urban
products required by the villages. The Soviet Fulfilment Commission, of
which Joseph Stalin is a member, recently announced considerable
shortcomings in the dispatching of such essentials as salt and flour to
rural districts.
The newspaper Economic Ljfe stresses similar
weakness in the delivery of manufactured goods. Even in Moscow Province,
for instance, only 6,ooo,ooo roubles’ worth of the 20,000,000 in goods
supply assigned to the villages has yet reached the local rail station.
It is true that concentration during recent years on
heavy industry and capital
investment has led to a shortage of consumers’ goods, but their volume
has been augmented of late, and their failure to reach the villages must
be ascribed to other causes, chiefly poor transportation and
distribution.
The transport problem remains to be solved, and
freight-car loadings still run 20 to 30 per Cent below the daily
schedule. In this respect there is a fruitful field for American
enterprise—technical assistance and equipment.
As matters now stand there is a big gap in the Soviet
Union between rural and urban producers. Money has little value to the
peasant unless he can obtain goods with it, and unless he can do that
there is no great stimulus for him to produce foodstuffs above his own
needs.
**********
RUSSIA IS WATCHNG JAPANESE IN
CHINA
But Will Take No Action to Halt Them Unless Soviet
Territory Is Involved.
TIME IS NOW VITAL FACTOR
By WALTER DURANTY
MOSCOW, Sept. 13.[1935]—While Europe’s attention is distracted by the war clouds darkening over Africa, the Japanese methodically continue
their piano for "extension of Influence over China, The Russian are
watching them impassively but with the keenest vigilance.
More than ten years ago the writer
was told by a Soviet
official who had spent considerable lute In the Par East:
"The Japanese are awaiting the opportunity which they believe the
Versailles Treaty will give them. Japan is convinced that within twenty
years from the signature of the treaty its imperfections and injustices
will provoke a now period of crisis that doubtless will terminate in
war. When that period begins Japan will feel free to ‘fulfil her
national ‘destiny’ by invading China."
View Declared Prophetic.
These words were prophetic because it is no mere accident that the
Japanese invasion of Manchuria coincided with the rise of Adolf Hitler.
But it is Interesting—and important—to note that the Russians have been
aware of the Japanese game from the outset.
To say that the Russians like what Japan is doing in China would be
absurd, but between disliking something and taking measures to prevent
it there is a great gulf. When it seemed two or three years ago that
the Japanese plans might threaten Soviet territory also. Moscow's
attitude was unmistakable. ‘Not one inch of Soviet land," said Stalin,
and he backed his words by forming the Far Eastern army with
its great warplane fleet. Today it can be stated positively that the
Soviet Union has no fear of a Japanese attack, but that does not mean
the Soviet Union is yet in a position to interfere with Japanese
expansion in China. There are frontier incidents aplenty between Inner
Mongolia. which is under .Japanese control, and Outer Mongolia, which
belongs to the Soviet sphere. Moscow newspapers this week publish a
dispatch from Britain hinting plainly that the murder of the British
journalist, Gareth Jones, by "bandits" on the western fringe of Outer
Mongolia was due to the fact that he knew too much about Japanese
military preparations and troop concentrations in that region. It is
thought here that Japan is on the verge of new action in Northern China,
with the aim of consolidating the five Northern provinces, including
Inner Mongolia, as a Japanese protectorate scarcely less disguised than
Manchukuo itself. Faced by this probability Soviet policy is definitely
"wait and see," because’ In point of fact the deeper the Japanese
get their feet into Chinese mud the better the Russians are
pleased.
Russians Need Time.
Of the cards that determine the issue in war and peace the
Kremlin holds in its hand all except One— namely, time. The
production of gold, food and machines, including chemicals, the
Soviet baa now developed to a point where henceforth it will
advance In geometrical progression. instead of the slow arithmetical
progression of the earlier period. But still time is needed—two or three years—to let that geometrical progression have full
play.
Thus one reaches this conclusive summary of Soviet-Japanese
relations. The Japanese make hay in China, while the war clouds gather
in Europe. The Russians watch them with no friendly eye, but will
not raise a finger to check them unless they commit direct
aggression against the Soviet Union.
.
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