Dr Müller’s Report
A Report on the Journey from
DOLONOR to KALGAN and The Imprisonment.
I left Peking on July 11th with
Baron von Plessen of the German Embassy and Mr. Gareth Jones formerly
private-secretary to Mr. Lloyd George and at the moment connected with
several respected English Newspapers and among other’s the Manchester
Guardian, in order to profit from an invitation of Prince TEH of the West
Sunnit in connection with The Sunnit-Mongol Congress. From Prince TEH’s
residence I started on a longer journey for the North East part of Inner
Mongolia, Herr PURPIS, director of the WOSTWAG in Kalgan, having most kindly
placed a motor -car at my disposal. Mr. Jones travelled with me, also my
boy, Liang, and,the Russian chauffeur, Anatoli PETREWSCHTSCHEW, At mid-day
on July 25th we were approaching Dolonor, our next objective. We were still
about 100 li. from the place when we fell in with an ox-cart carrying to my
surprise, the flags of Manchukuo and Japan. The Chinese in charge of the
cart explained to me that these flags had been presented to him by Japanese
in the village of HUANG-C’HITA-YING-TZE, and that this place new belonged to
Manchukuo. That was for me the first indication that the situation in
Dolonor had changed since my last visit in August 1934. At that time I
sought out the chief of the special Mission of the Kwantung Army in Dolonor,
Major UEYAMA, and asked him what was the situation in Dolonor and the
explanation of his own presence there.
Major Ueyama assured me that
Manchukuo raised no claim to Dolonor, but on the contrary that it was
undoubtedly Chinese territory. He went on to say that during and after the
fighting with Fang Yu-hsiang in 1933, the Chinese authorities in Dolonor had
left, a vacuum had arisen from which occasions of conflict might easily
arise, and to prevent this the Special Commission had been created. When I
asked him what was the nature of General Li-Shou-hsin’s troops then in
Dolonor, Ueyama replied that they were not Manchukuo troops but rather of
the character of a local militia. In contradiction Ueyama’s explanations it
is in any case certain that there was in Dolonor a Manchukuo Post Office,
as, early as March1934.
This year we saw on the day
after our arrival the whole town bedecked with new Manchukuo and Japanese
flags, and we learned that these had been distributed by the Japanese three
or four days, before our arrival with orders to raise them in order to
salute the entry of new Japanese troops. I learnt from on old acquaintance,
TSOI, whom I chanced to meet in Dolonor and who to now a Manchukuo official
in Weichang. (Jehol), that at the same time as the Japanese in June were
sending, troops to Kupeikuu and Shanhaikuan, they directed a mechanised
brigade, towards Weichang, and that the advance of this brigade in the
direction, at Chahar had begun about July 22nd. About 80 armoured cars
reached Dolonor on the first day of the advance, the numbers increasing
daily till the time of our departure. In Dolonor itself we saw an
enormous number of apparently brand-new three axled heavy military lorries,
tanks, and staff motor-cars, and learned, that an appreciably larger number
had already left Dolonor travelling in a southerly direction, I was informed
that the destination of these units was KUYAN and, CH’IH-CH’ENG or
alternatively PAOCH’ANG and KANGPAO, the first-mentioned lying in the
direction of K’ANG CHUANG, first station on the Peking-Suiyuan line North of
Nankou, and the other two in the direction of Kalgan. The town of Dolonor
itself was full of Japanese military, and Li Shou-hsin’ s soldiers, now
openly provided. with Manchukuo badges, seemed to have completely merged
their identity with theirs. As far as I could discover most of Li’s, men are
at present stationed south of Dolonor, one squadron strong in Ch’I-HOU for
example, 50 li to the eastward of PAOCH’ANG, and two squadrons ERH--TAO
MU-T’OU, 70 li westward of PAOCH’ANG. The fighting strength at present
available in the neighbourhood of of Dolonor is estimated at about 7000
Manchukuo under Li Shou-hsin and from 4 to 5000 Japanese troops under Yano.
I found, the number at Japanese
officials in Dolonor appreciably increased since last year. In addition to
the Kwantung Army Special Mission there existed a special headquarters staff
of the Kwantung Army and further a Dolonor council together with a Council
for the Ch’eng-the (Jehol City) 5th Army controlled area. There
exists in addition a Branch of the Imperial Japanese Commission, dealing
with road building questions. The Company for the Improvement of
Neighbouring nations already active last year, has strengthened its
personnel and there must be other Japanese organs in Dolonor of which our
short stay did not permit us to ascertain the nature. On my return to Peking
I learnt that Dolonor possessed in addition an Economic Commission.
According to the said Tsoi,,
the official annexation of East Chahar by Manchukuo was proclaimed some days
before our arrival - a piece of information which we were unable to confirm,
perhaps owing to the intimidation of the Chinese Population and the fact
that they cannot be induced to make any pronouncement however faintly
connected with Japanese activities. A proclamation of GeneraI Li Shou-hsin
of July 17th, posted up in every place, merely stated that he had
taken over the responsibility for peace and Quiet Eastern Chahar, and that
the people would flourish exceedingly under the ‘Kingly Principle’ (wang~tao).
No mention was made of Manchukuo, in the proclamation. On July 26th
we (Jones, my Boy and self) visited the Headquarters of the Kwantung Army
Special Commission. We found that Major Ueyama, as we were told, was at the
Front, and we were next received by an Indian from Travancore, named Nair
known to us as an Indian nationalist and a former Member of the National
Congress and General Secretary of the Pan-Asiatic League. He has for years
been permanently resident in Dairen. He speaks fluent English and Japanese
and was useful to us as an interpreter. Of the members of the Mission we saw
only a young man with whom we touched upon among other subjects the question
of our return to Kalgan. He was kind enough to give us a document of
recommendation which was to insure us considerate treatment fro m any
Japanese Military we might meet.
We intended, after our visit to
the Special Mission to proceed to the two big Lama temples to west of the
town to inspect them and at the same time pay a visit to a Japanese Lama,
Hashimoto, whom I had met in the proceeding year. On the way thither we
noticed in the streets a great number military cars and stopped to admire
their perfect equipment for expeditions over the heavy plains of Inner
Mongolia.
We made another short stop
before the Yemen of Li Shou-hein where noted the apparently new title of the
office; Ch’a-tung too-pieh tue-chih-chu. Thereupon as we were progressing
along the road outside the town, three Japanese soldier’s with rifles in
their hands came running after us, began to address us in an excited way,
and finally attempted to subject us to a personal search. We showed them the
document we had just received from the Special Mission, and insisted on our
being led back to it. In the premises of the Social Mission, where we had to
stay more or less against our will for about three hour, we were subjected
to a kind of cross examination by a whole crowd of Japanese Officers and
finally by Yano the officer commanding the mechanised brigade which had just
arrived. This only came to an end after I had been identified by the
Japanese Lama named HASHIMOTO who in the meanwhile had been summoned, and by
another Japanese whom I had met last year. It became apparent in the course
of the cross-examination that the Japanese soldiers who had arrested us
believed that we were after military secrets. We had aroused suspicion by
our having been repeatedly seen standing about in the street. The outcome of
this second stay in the premises of the Special Mission was that we were
informed that we might go back to our inn and remain in it until our
departure. We were asked about the date of our departure and what our
further plans were. The following information about the roads leading to
Kalgan was given us:-the road usually used by motor traffic via Kalgan was
on account of rain much use in an extraordinarily bad condition, and there
could be no question of our going that way; the second road sometimes used
by motor cars via Taliangti was just as bad and in addition to which there
was a risk of bandits; the best and safest road at the moment was that which
passed from Dolonor via Huang ch’i ta-yingtze over the River Shang-tu-ho and
thence by Habarga, Paooh’ang, Malakamiao, and Changpeihsien to Kalgan. In
the existing circumstances only the last named route could be recommended.
This the road which we followed
when at five o’clock on the next morning, the 27th July, we left Dolonor,
and on which at about 1.0 p.m. on the 28th July we were attacked
by bandits.
In the course of the journey as
soon as the first morning we came to a place where our car could not pass;
this was south of Habarga after passing a small Mongol settlement called
Shabu—nor. From this place some Mongols called to the rescue proved
themselves, very difficult; first they unblushingly asked for an enormous
sum of money, and then showed themselves incapable of pulling the car out of
the sand. In the meantime night was falling and it had begun to rain, so
they promised to come back next morning with more men, oxen, implements and
wooden planks. During the dark rainy night which ensued, and which we spent
in our tent, there appeared from the direction of HABARGA, according to a
later admission from our Chinese guide, four mounted men who came up to our
camp and after a while three of the four returned northwards, while the
fourth rode on further southwards. Very late the next morning the Mongols
appeared, neither bringing with them the wooden planks they had promised,
nor being in the least prepared to get down to the job unless we
considerably increased the promise of money. Luck so had it that while we
were yet bargaining, another troop of Mongols rode up led by GOMBOYAP, a
personal friend of mine, who chanced to be in the neighbourhood and having
heard of a stranded motor-car, had immediately realised it must be ours,
since be had heard of our expedition. With the help of QUBOYAP and his
friends, with whom now the first Mongols joined forces, we succeeded without
undue exertion in getting the car out of the sand and on to firm ground, so
that at about noon we continued our journey southwards.
About an hour later we
approached a small Chinese settlement situated in a pass and named HO-CHIA-TA-HUO,
the district being known as KUAN-MA-HOU (sic.?KOU). On entering the place
Mr. Jones noticed and pointed out to me a man in uniform. I told him that we
had now left the Japanese Zone and might expect to meet Chinese gendarmerie.
And in fact as we proceeded through the village we saw several me wearing
the familiar blue uniform of the Pao-an-tui. On leaving the village,
suddenly from both sides our car was shot at, which, as we were able later
to ascertain, originated to the extent of some 35 shots from service rifles,
and to the extent of one shot from a machine gun which was put out of action
owing to a jam. (literally - difficulty in loading). Two bullet holes were
visible in the hood of the car. The chauffeur pulled up immediately. I leapt
out and ran in the direction of the firing proceeding from the left hand
side, shouting as I ran. They ceased firing, signalled me to approach, and
declared with many apologies that it was due to a misunderstanding, They
said they had been ordered to protect this road against robbers and to
prevent the passage of Japanese motor-cars along it. They said they had
taken our car for a Japanese one and invited me into a
neighbouring farm house to drink tea and to receive the apologies of their
leader. While I was accepting, Mr. Jones had also got out of the car. He was
immediately surrounded by a number of the people who had fired upon us,
bound, and led into another house where he was sat on the K’ang. The cord
with which his bands were tied behind his back was thrown over a rafter in
the root, and behind him came a man with a noose. Mr. Jones thought, as he
told me later, that they intended to hang him. But after a few minutes they
let him step down oft the K’ang and brought him to the house where I was.
Before Mr. Jones had appeared
at my place, my Boy had come accompanied by one of the blue uniformed men
with a part of our luggage. On my asking what was the meaning of this, they
said it was a mere formality, as they had orders to examine all baggage and
could make no exceptions, To my surprise I noticed that while, the
examination of the baggage, which had begun in quite an orderly way, was
going on, one of the men picked up and put in his pocket a few silver
dollars. When I protested, and said that was hardly worth of the Pao-an-Tui,
one of the replied, "We are not Pao-an-Tui, we are just bandits." So that
when Jones was brought to me, and we had discussed the situation, we saw
that the only thing to be done was to be submissive. Meanwhile the bandits
had begun to dictate to my Boy the list of demands, which was as follows.-
$100,000 in cash, 40 rifles, with 20,000 rounds of ammunition, 20 automatic
pistols with 20,000 rounds of ammunition, 20 revolvers with 20,000 rounds of
ammunition.
To the piece at paper on which
these demands were written I added another, on which I wrote to this effect
- We are in hands of bandits; the demands are to be found on the
accompanying sheet". (in English) Thereupon Jones and I signed it, and dated
it the 28th July’ The two notes were given to the Boy, who with
the chauffeur, the latter having this, while been bound in the other place,
were ordered by the bandits to proceed to Pao Ch’ang and Kalgan.
Chauffeur and Boy reached PAO
CH’ANG HSIEN at about six o’clock in the afternoon, and reported to the
Chinese authorities, namely the Officer commanding the Pao An-tui
(gendarmerie) and the district Magistrate. These informed by telephone the
provincial government in Kalgan, and at the same time took appropriate
measures to get into contact with the bandits who had taken us prisoner.
There could be no question of using the military or police to apply coercion
for apart from the fact that such a procedure would have endangered our
lives, the forces at the disposal of the authorities were in no way
sufficient. The troops which were formerly stationed there, namely a
detachment of the XXIXth. army under Sung Che-Yuan were in June withdrawn in
compliance with the notorious demands of the Japanese. On the 18th
July the G.O. Special Mission of the Kangtung Army at Dolonor, Major Ueyame,
appearsd at PAO CH’ANG HSIEN in person with more than twenty motor cars and
six tanks. He announced that from henceforth in all districts of East Chahar,
the Pao~An-tui should be limited to150 men per district (Hsien), and that
each man should not be equipped with more then one rifle and 100 rounds of
ammunition. Major UEYEMA spent till the 2lst July in convincing himself that
the measures which he had commanded were being carried out, and this he did
by means of frequent visits each day in which he did not consider beneath
his dignity personally to count over the rifles and cartridges, and to take
away any issued in excess of the number laid down. It may be observed in
parenthesis, that these visits were also used as an opportunity of
intimidating the Chinese Officials and of going through their official
papers. According to the two gentlemen in question, the district Magistrate
himself was subjected to maltreatment by one of the Japanese officers.
Thus deprived of the means of
coercion, the O.C. Pao An-Tui ordered a sergeant of the mounted police to go
to the bandits as an intermediary. His name was PAO Yun-chi. The only
indication he possessed was the note on which were written the demands for
the ransom, and on the reverse side the place of our captivity with the
signature Liu-tze (stable mates) of Chui-hung (orange red). Liu-tze is an
expression used in bandit circles for a small band of perhaps twenty or
thirty men, and chui -hung is a typical robbers pseudonym. With these clues
the Sergeant, Chang Yu-Chi and three police men allotted to him, mounted and
in uniform though unarmed, set off on our trail and found us on the
afternoon of the following day. Gareth Jones and I at our place of captivity
had been immediately deprived of all our personal possessions with the one
exception of the clothes we were wearing, ie. Shoes, stockings, shirt, and
shorts. They had even taken our spectacles. Then both of us were rigged out
with long blue trouser, coat to match, and a coolie hat; these things had
been easily procured, simply by taking them from the peasants standing
round. In the meanwhile the bandits together with their horses bad
assembled, and we saw that they were from 26 to 30 men strong. Each man was
carrying either a rifle, or pistol, or a light machine gun. All were
mounted, and in addition they were about half dozen spare horses. We each
ware given a horse and were compelled to ride with the bandits, proceeding
partly along the tracks and partly across pasture, arable, and mountains in
a north-easterly direction. In these and the two following days we went in a
great band toward the east, which brought us back again on Tuesday the 30th
July to the neighbourhood of the main road to PA) CH’ANG HSIEN. The
treatment they meted out was good, soon as they had got over their first
excitement, and the measure taken for our comfort as good as could be
expected in the circumstances. We lived in the wretched plague-infested
houses of the poor tenant farmers of the neighbourhood, and for food were
dependent on what they bed in hand. The bandits took no provisions with
them.
Although we had been on the
march a considerable parts of the time, the emissary of the Chinese
authorities succeeded in overtaking us by Monday afternoon in the village,
at which we had stopped for the midday meal. On approaching the sentries
posted by the bandits on the crests of neighbouring hills, the sergeant and
his men were shot at by the latter. Then after a white flag had been waved,
the firing ceased, and they were taken prisoner, and brought bound to the
village, It was hours before the bandit chief declared himself ready for
them to be unbound and brought in for an interview.
We knew nothing of these goings
on, because we were being held in a house some distance away. Only towards
six o’clock, when we were stretching our limbs in front of the house, did we
see two of the new arrivals, end shortly afterwards CHANG Y-CHI, who
approached us and briefly announced that we need not be frightened, that he
had come about our liberation and that I, whom he addressed should ride with
him to PAO CH’ANG HSIEN. Before we had recovered from our astonishment, he
had disappeared back into the house from which he had emerged, end which was
the H.Q. of the chief of this band. The bandits told off to watch us were
able to say that this man maintained he had been sent by the Chinese
authorities in PAO CH’ANG HSIEN, and deposed that he himself had previously
been a bandit, but no one knew him; he also claimed to know me personally.
To this assertion I could only reply that I did not remember him. For the
rest, our guards warned us not to trust this man, who appeared to them very
suspicious. Gareth Jones and I indeed did not feel ourselves inclined to set
much trust in this self-styled rescuer. That these men were in uniform we
could not admit as a proof that they really belonged to the PAO AN-TUI i.e.
the Police, seeing that the bandits who had captured us were for the most
part wearing the uniform of the Pao An-tui. Our distrust was only increased
when long after nightfall CHANG YU-CHI with several bandit leaders came into
our bedroom, end when we asked him for a proof (papers d’indentite), he
replied that be had one but that the bandits had taken it from him even more
suspicious was that when we asked him the name of te magistrate of PAO
CH’ANG HSIEN he said he did not know him.
So it was with some scepticism
that we listened to his announcement that he had been sent by the
authorities at PAO CH’ANG to rescue us, that he had not succeeded in
negotiating the immediate release of both of us, but that the bandit had now
seen that they could not count on being arms and ammunition and that they
were also prepared to lower their,demands for ransom. He said, they were now
ready to release both of us if Mexican- 50,OO0 was paid over, to them, on
condition it was not in (a). the form of a new issue of notes, (b) notes of
consecutive numbers, (c) notes with handwriting on. In order to negotiate
with the Chinese and ultimately with the British and German authorities,
over the payment of the ransom they were ready to let me depart with CHANG
YU-CHI if I promised to return after the performance of my mission. At the
same time they demanded that one at least one or at best two of the
policemen should remain with Gareth Jones in their hands as hostages and a
substitute for me. On the following morning they waived their demands to
take the police men as hostages and that I should go back to them. They were
however most emphatic however that only payment of the ransom would save the
life of Gareth Jones. During the night and following morning Jones and I
discussed the situation. We were not in the least convinced that the avowed
emissary of the Chinese Authorities were acting in good faith, and we
considered it was quite possible that these men were the delegates of
another band of robbers, about whom our bandits has told us. Our captors had
said that among this other band there were various Koreans and several
Japanese, and that if we were in their hands, we certainly would not have
had long to live. It seemed to us feasible to suppose that the new arrivals
might have been sent by the other band to our camp, in order to fetch me,
who spoke Chinese to their camp, where I could be cross-examined and
eventually put of the way. On the other hand we told ourselves that the same
fate equally well await us in the camp of our captors and all this play
acting might be superfluous. As it was the one fact that Chang Yu-Chi was
ignorant of the name of the District Magistrate of Pao Ch’ang Hsien had made
us distrustful of him so we decided that our position did not warrant us in
neglecting even a feeble chance of ultmate liberation, After the bandits had
led us back to the village name KOTIR on the road leading to PAO Ch’ang. I
took leave took of Jones, and after a ride of about three hours I did after
all find myself in PAO CH’ANG whereupon all doubts about the character of
Chang Yu- Chi and his three men in police uniform were naturally set at
rest.
The main reason why the bandits
assented to my liberation rather than that of Jones was probably because I
had a command of the language and thus possessed both the possibility of
conducting negotiations with the Chinese authorities, and their confidence,
that I would do the same. Another factor may have been that Gareth Jones was
the better horse-man, and they feared, if the necessity of more rapid
movement from place to place should arise, being hampered by my presence.
They themselves however said that I owed the fact of their choice falling on
me to the fact that I was a German.
The Chinese authorities in PAO
CH’ANG HSIEN received me in the most friendly way, and I remained their
guest until a message by telephone was on 31st July brought in by a motor
belonging to WOSTWAG. After consultation with the District Magistrate and
O.C. Pao An-tui, to which at my request CHANG YU-CHI was brought, we decided
the best thing was that CHANG, who had proved himself a skilled negotiator,
should on the morning of the 1st August go once more to the
bandits, and remain in touch with them until I had seen the authorities in
Kalgan, or it necessary, Peking and had examined the possibility of consent
to the payment of ransom. CHANG declared himself willing, and himself
proposed that he should take along come better provisions for Jones That was
agreed to by the two officials, and in addition I gave him a
letter for Jones. CHANG YU-CHI promised to attempt to secure the immediate
release of Jones, it need be through the surrender of Chinese hostages. I
myself went on the morning of the 31st from PAO CH’ANG HSEIN to
Kalgan, where Lieut. Millar of the British Embassy was awaiting me. Captain
Scott also joined us that evening. I reported to both these gentlemen, and
both were of the opinion that my liberation must necessarily be final, that
we had acted wisely, and facilitated further negotiations They begged me to
return at once to Peking and give a verbal report to the British and German
Embassies.
Meanwhile I had already made
contact with the Chinese authorities in Kalgan during a two hour
conversation with members at the Chahar provincial administration, at which
Lieut. Millerr was present, I had informed them of what had happened and
obtained the assurance that instructions would be sent to PAO CH’ANG that
very evening, the demands of the bandits to be lessened as far as possible
but in any to be satisfied so as to obtain the earliest possible liberation
of the prisoner.
On the night of July 31st
I returned to Peking, where I reported to the German, British end Chinese
authorities viva voce and in writing, and discussed with the Deputy-governor
of Chahar, Mr. Ch’ien, and the representative of the Nanking Government, Mr.
Wang Kei-min, the measures to be taken for setting Mr Jones at liberty. Both
Chahar Government and Central Government declared their readiness through
the above named gentlemen to pay any ransom the case might demand. Having
successfully concluded this business I turned back for Kalgan on the
afternoon of August 2nd , so as to keep in contact with the
Chinese Officials and place myself at their disposal in case my cooperation
should be necessary.‘ On the 3rd I and Lieut. Miller obtained an
interview from the Secretary of the Chahar Government and learned that CHANG
had been again to see the bandits, but had not been able to obtain the
immediate release of Mr Jones. On the other hand the money had been reduced
to $8,000, and the situation could have been liquidated in a day or two if
the bandits had not left the PAO CH’ANG neighbourhood on the 2nd and crossed
over to that of Kuyan. For this circumstance the Captain of the Pao an-tui
in Kuyuan was intentionally responsible not having been informed that
negotiations with the bandits were in progress end consequently setting his
Gendarmerie in motion against them. It appeared the bandits had last been
seen on the march for the Jehol border near the village of SHUANG CHIENG-TZE
some 30 li East of KUYUAN hsien, whence they were continuing in a
South-easterly direction. It seemed certain that there were still 100 strong
moving in three columns. Their leader, PAO FANG-WU to whom were attached two
Japanese, and the second in command, a professional brigand it appeared was
LO LAO-HAG-TSE (old rat Lo). PAO FANG-WU’S Japanese had proposed to despatch
Gareth Jones, but PAO had not assented to this and handed him over for
safety’s sake to a easier group of former Chinese, whom he had made
responsible for his protection. The Chahar provincial Government had
despatched a second negotiator on the morning of the 3rd to Kuyuan Hsien, to
re-establish contact with the bandits. The choice was eespecially fortunate
since the man was an old acquaintance of Pao’s and official of the
Chahar Provinincial Government. Better results, could be expected from him,
since CHANG had lost the confidence of the bandit who supposed that he had
brought about the movement of the Pao An-Tui from Kuyuan Hsien.
Further information from the
Chinese Authorities not being obtained for the next few days, I paid a visit
on the evening of the 5th to Colonel MATSUI, representative in
Kalgan of the Japanese North China garrison Colonel MATSUI told me, that he
had received information that afternoon to the effect that the bandits with
Gareth Jones had passed the Jehol frontier and were at present in the Feng
Ning Hsien district. He had just telegraphed to urge the Japanese
Authorities in Jehol City (Cheng-Te) with the utmost haste to take all steps
for Jones’ liberation without endangering his life by calling troops and
aeroplanes into play. This information rendered useless the plan devised by
Lieut. Miller and myself on the 2nd and only provisionally
postponed at the wish of the Chinese Authorities, of proceeding in person to
KuYuan Hsien, and I returned to Peking on the 6th.
No information of importance is
to hand at present according to Takahashi, the Japanese Military Attaché,
the bandits who crossed the Jehol frontier on August 5th
travelling East, crossed it again going West on the 6th or 7th and are again
in Chahar territory in the Kuyuan neighbourhood. Jones was seen there on the
8th alive and well, while, the Japanese Authorities declare that
they have now lost contact with the bandits, the information obtainable from
the Chinese is confined to an assertion that they have re-entered into touch
with the bandits and that they expect their efforts to liberate Jones to be
attended with en early success. Apparently the demands of the original
bandit group for a sum of $8 to 10,000 have been satisfied. But before Jones
could be handed over, he was taken over by another group, who now insist on
the payment of the rest of the original demand viz. $l00,000 and delivery at
200 pistols and ammunition. While official reports mention only Chinese
bandits the truth must be somewhat different The bandits into whose hands we
fell made the following declarations that they are pure Chinese from the
present Manchukuo, had then entered the Japanese service and had received
from a Japanese Authority in Jehol the commission to cross the Chahar border
and to create as much trouble there as they could. They were in addition
furnished with uniforms and weapons together with an inconsiderable sum in
bullion; to prove this they showed us brand new notes of the Manchukuo
Central Bank, of which they claimed to possess several cases. They have not
yet however found anyone in Chahar ready to accept this money, and would
have been compelled, even without the Japanese commission, to take to
banditry. They had crossed the Jehol boundary in different sections between
the 20th and 23rd July, the sections being composed of
two large bands of 300 men, known as TI- Ii-CHYH-TUI-and TI –ERH-CHI-TUI.
They themselves belonged to the first band, which only included Chinese and
their leader was one CHT from HEILUNGKIANG. In the second band
was a number of Korean under the leadership of a Japanese. Had we fallen
into the hands of the second band, we should not have had a chance of
escaping with our lives. As for them they hated the Japanese and thought of
themselves as good Chinese, compelled however to obey Japanese orders for
fear of their families in Manchukuo.
How far this account is correct
is very hard to say. CHANG YU-CHI was perfectly convinced of its authority
and our own suppositions were much confirmed by the following incident. Our
bandits told us that their first precise commission on Chahar soil was to
attack on the white Mongol Banner and thus attempt to kill a Mongol Militia
leader called MAO, who was person non grata to the Japanese on account at
his strong Chinese propensities. $4O a head had been promised to the members
of the group if they successfully accomplished their mission and brought
back Mao’s head to the Japanese. Having attempted an attack they were driven
back by the considerably stronger Mongol Militia with the loss of two lives.
The White Mongol Banner has its land and pastures on the direct road between
Larsen’s farm and Dolonor. On July 22nd a small party of
foreigners, including Eriksen, the Swedish Missionary doctor, Sir Charles
Bell, and Captain Scott, were motoring along this road. They were warned
that there were 25 to 30 bandits further to the East, who made an attack on
the White Mongol Banner but had been driven back. This independent piece of
information, which we received, that same day from the travellers in
Larsen’s camp, seemed to refer to the very attack of which our bandits had
spoken. The Chinese Authorities were also aware, that such an attack had
been made on the Mongol White Banner.
How far the bandits were
following their general orders - as far as our capture was concerned - to
create trouble or were acting on special instructions cannot for the moment
be known with certainty. In any case it is very clear, that our misfortune
occurred on a route recommended to us by the Japanese, and there is a
possibility that the rider who passed our camp in SHAGU-NOR on the night of
the 27th was carrying special orders to he bandits.
The firing on us on the 28th
took place in a way that led us to suppose that the bandits had more to do
merely than hold up our car. Apart from the rifles, a machine gun also
opened fire (made by the Mukden arsenal), and only the circumstances that it
immediately jammed saved our car from stopping more than two bullets and
ourselves any at all.
The manner of our capture makes
it appear indubitable, that our visit to Dolonor coinciding as it did with
important military action in Chahar was most unwelcome to the Japanese.
On August 20th I
made a rebuttal to the Central News Agency on a statement of ‘Nanking’s
Opinion on the Jones’ Case’ which could not be passed in silence by the
surviving member of the party which travelled from Kalgan to Te-Wang-fu,
Pei tze-miao, (Beidzemiao) Western Ujmutchin, Eastern Sunnit and Dolonor
between July 11th and July 27th and which was
attacked by bandits on the way back to Kalgan on the 28th of
July.
At the time our party left
Kalgan there were no reports of rampant banditry in any parts of Inner
Mongolia. A large party of foreigners was staying at Mr Larsen’s place and
making long excursions into the country without being molested in any way.
Others coming from Kalgan and Suiyan converged on the residence of the
Western Sunnit Prince to participate in the Obo festival of that tribe,
which took place on July 14th.
There was nothing adventurous
about a trip in Inner Mongolia at that time and accordingly there was no
special warning and the pledge relieving the Chinese authorities, as I,
myself, had done it before for years, was a matter of routine. We got
permission - valid for one month - to travel to Inner Mongolia, Erhlien
and Pai Ling-miao, but the borders of Inner Mongolia are not yet fixed,
there was no warning given against proceeding to Dolonor and consequently
the travellers showed no utter disregard to such warning. I am an
experienced traveller and have known Inner Mongolia since 1913 and I have
gone over thousands of miles there. I know the risks and hardships of
travelling in those parts and, when approached by Mr Gareth Jones for
advice as to a visit to Inner Mongolia, I recommended a more comfortable
trip based on the Suiyan Railway although he was himself making
preparations for an extended journey into Eastern Chahar. But advice from
a third party prevailed and I consented, very reluctantly, to accept the
company of Mr Gareth Jones, telling him quite openly that it was the first
time I had taken another foreigner on such a trip and that by doing so I
was acting against my principles.
My intention on this trip was
to visit Eastern Chahar up to the Manchukuo and outer Mongolian boundary
and to study the activities of Japan in those parts. This tallied with Mr
Jones' plans, which were to travel in the East in order to study Japanese
activities on the Asiatic continent in general. The route which the party
took after leaving Dolonor and which has puzzled obviously a number of
people, was not of our own choosing, but was recommended to us by the
Japanese military authorities at Dolonor who declared all other routes to
be impracticable and who dictated to the party the stations to be passed
by us, which included Huangchitayingtze, Szelangcheng, Habarga and Pao
Ch’ang Hsien.
Though Dr Müller gave this very
comprehensive report, much of it was suppressed in the British press by His
Majesty’s Government (according to The Week), particularly the details
relating to the presence of Japanese troops in Dolonor for this was
considered to be of a politically sensitive nature.
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